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The Demand for Money by Firms:




COMPUSTAT data on 12,000 firms for the years 1956–1992 indicate that large firms hold less cash as
a percentage of sales than do small ones. Whether comparisons are made within or across industries, the
elasticity of cash balances with respect to sales is about 0.75. Firms headquartered in counties with high
wages hold more money for a given level of sales, a finding consistent with the idea that time can
substitute for money in the provision of transactions services. The estimates are consistent with both scale
economies in the holding of money and secular declines in velocity.
*This research has benefitted from discussions with Gary Becker, Hiroshi Fujiki, Bob Lucas, Allan Meltzer, Derek
Neal, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, and participants at the October 1994 NBER Monetary Economics meeting. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or
the Federal Reserve System.Table of Contents
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economies is an important determinant of the efficiency of the inflation tax from a Ramsey
(1927) point of view.
I. Introduction
A quantitative knowledge of the demand for money is necessary for predicting and
explaining inflation and interest rates.  Such knowledge may also be relevant for the branch
of monetary theory which seeks to understand how and why money is such an important part
of market transactions.  Money is also a fiscal tool: seignorage is an important source of revenue
for many governments.  Even for those countries with relatively slow monetary growth, the
inflation tax may impose sizable burdens on the economy.  Quantitative estimates of the
demand for money - especially estimates of the degree of scale economies - are required to
determine the socially optimal use of this fiscal tool.
1
This paper estimates a parametric model of the demand for money by firms using
longitudinal data on the sales, money holdings, and other variables at the firm-level.  The firm-
level data indicate that there are economies of scale in the holding of money - the sales
elasticity of money demand is found to be about 0.75.  There is also some evidence that time is
a substitute for money - the elasticity of money demand with respect to a proxy for the cost of
labor is about 0.75.
The paper builds on Mulligan (1997) in three ways.  First, parameters of the empirical
model are linked to those of an explicit maximizing model of firm behavior.  Second, the
empirical specification in the present paper is much more realistic, allowing for price deflators
that are a function of a firm's input and output prices, lags in the money demand function, firm-
specific opportunity costs of holding money, nonlinear demand functions, and financial
technology that varies according to urban location.  Third, the model is estimated using a
broader sample of COMPUSTAT firms.
I argue that cross-sectional studies of the demand for money enjoy a useful identifying
restriction - the degree of financial sophistication is relatively constant across regions, firms,
or households.  Such a restriction is less plausible for time series data, where, during certain
periods, there are secular trends in the level of financial technology.  NOW accounts, automaticScale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 2
teller machines, and credit cards might be considered as modern examples.
This study is part of a small literature that uses cross-sectional data to identify the
parameters of a money demand function.  Included in that literature are Meltzer (1963a),
Maddala and Vogel (1965), and Whalen (1965) who study cross-sections of industry aggregates,
Feige (1964) and Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1992) who study cross-sections of regional
aggregates, and Lee (1964), Radecki and Garver (1987), and Bomberger (1993) who study cross-
sections of households.  Although these cross-section studies invoke different identifying
restrictions than do time series studies, many problems remain.  Regional and household data
have the problem that the cost of substitutes for money (in particular, time) are highly
correlated with the scale of operation.  Different firms, on the other hand, may face different
wages and other prices in a way that is uncorrelated with the scale of operation.  Interstate
banking complicates regional data and income measurement error plagues cross-sectional
studies of households, but the longitudinal structure of the COMPUSTAT data allow me to
ascertain the importance of various measurement errors.
Section II writes down and parameterizes a production function for firms.  The demand
for money is defined and related to the production parameters.  The firm data is described in
section III and used in section IV to estimate parameters of the production function.  Section
IV addresses the possibility that estimates of the scale and wage elasticities are biased as the
result of the omission of proxies for production parameters, business cycle variables, price
levels, or measurement errors.  Section V compares firms' demand for the more narrowly
defined "money" with the demand for liquid assets.  Section VI discusses previous studies that
have used aggregate data, comparing the aggregate estimates with the firm-level estimates
here.  An appendix displays some sample characteristics.yit ￿ f Xit, Tit, ￿it
yit ￿ f xit￿￿it, Tit ￿
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      J=1 is chosen for simplicity.  The analysis could be generalized by replacing x with a
2
homogeneous function many inputs (eg., several types of labor and several types of capital).
(1)
II. A Parametric Model of the Demand for Money by Firms
II.A Final Production Function
The production or sales (I do not distinguish the two until Section IV) of firm i at date
t, denoted y , is a function of a J-dimensional vector of inputs X  as well as the quantity of it                   it
transactions services used at date t, T . it
where ￿ is technological shift parameter.  For simplicity, I consider the case when there is one
input (J=1) and parameterize the function f:  
2
For ￿=1, transactions services are combined with x+￿ in a CES fashion, with elasticity of
substitution ￿.  However, production is not homogeneous for ￿g1.  As I show later, there are
economies (diseconomies) of scale in the holding of money as ￿<1 (￿>1).  As the importance of
transactions services becomes small relative to the other input x, the production function
exhibits approximately constant returns to scale in x+￿.
II.B Production of Transactions Services
Transactions services depend on real money balances held by the firm.  Firms can enjoy
more transactions services for a given stock of money by using certain types of capital and
labor.  For simplicity, I consider a single labor input but it is straight-forward to allow for other
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      Section IV discusses the price index used to deflate nominal money balances and
3
implications of the deflating method for interpreting the empirical results.
      For a discussion of the relationship between "money in the production function" and
4
apparently different motivations for the demand for money, see Fischer (1974), Feenstra (1986),
or Fujiki and Mulligan (1996).
      A static cost minimization condition such as (3) holds in some intertemporal models.  See
5
Fujiki and Mulligan (1996) for an example.
(2)
m  is the stock of real money balances held by firm i at date t.   The quantity l  of labor is used it                                it
3
by the firm to produce transactions services.  The elasticity of substitution between money and
labor is 5 .  A  is a productivity parameter reflecting, say, exogenous changes in the "financial 1    it
sophistication" of the firm.
Some models of the demand for money suggest that money balances or transactions
services are complements with the other inputs.   This might be expressed in my model as a
4
parameter restriction ￿<1.  That labor substitutes for money in the provision of transactions
services can be represented as 5  > 1. 1
II.C Cost Minimizing Demand for Money
It is assumed that firms rent inputs (including money and labor) so as to minimize the
cost of production c .   Cost is the sum of the rental expenditures: it
5
where the rental cost of x is normalized to one.  The rental rate of money is the nominal interest
rate R  and is assumed to be the same for all firms.  Different firms may rent labor at different t
wage rates, reflecting perhaps regional differences in the market for the type of labor needed
to produce transactions services.  Cost minimizing or derived demands for the four inputs are
written as a function of the level of sales y , the two prices w and R as well as the productivity it
parameter A.  I denote the derived demand for money by the function L:mit ￿ L yit, Rt , wit, Ait, ￿it
m
x
projection of expansion path
mit ￿ g1 xit, Rt, wit, Ait, ￿it ￿ L H ￿1(xit, Rt, wit, Ait, ￿it),Rt,wit, Ait, ￿it
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(3)
Figure 1 Projection of Expansion Path
(4)
Imagine fixing a price vector and varying the level of sales, tracing out an expansion path in
the (x,l,m) space.  This expansion path is a one dimensional manifold in a three dimensional
space, but can be shown on paper by projecting it  into the (m, x) plane.  One such projection
is shown in Figure 1.
The projection of the expansion path, denoted g , is formally defined in terms of the derived 1
demand for money, L, and the derived demand for x, H:
where H  is the inverse of the derived demand for x = H(y,R,w,A,￿).
-1
In general, the shape of the expansion path depends on the prices but for the functional
forms (1) and (2), one can write money demand as a log-linear function of the demand for x, thelog mit ￿ log g1 xit, Rt, wit, Ait, ￿it ￿ ￿ log (xit￿￿it) ￿ ￿ log Rt ￿ %1(51 ￿ ￿)l o g
w it
Rt
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)l o gA it ￿ Q( 51, ￿, ￿, ￿f, ￿1)
log mit ￿ log L yit, Rt, wit, Ait , ￿it ￿ ￿ log yit ￿ ￿ log Rt ￿ %1(51 ￿ ￿)l o g
w it
Rt
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)l o gA it ￿ (constant)
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      The expansion path is not log-linear in w/R; the constant %  in equation (4)' is derived from
6
1
a log linear approximation to this term.  %  is labor's share of the cost of producing transactions 1




Q is an intercept term that is a function of the production parameters only.  A projection of the
expansion path into the (m,x+￿) plane has a constant elasticity equal to ￿.  Holding constant
w/R, the elasticity with respect to the nominal interest rate is the constant -￿.
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Given x, increases in the level of financial technology, A , decrease the demand for it
money when ￿ is less than one, but increase money demand for ￿ > 1.  The effect of technology
on the demand for money depends on the interest elasticity of money demand.  To see this,
notice that holding constant w/R, the price of transactions services is the ratio R/A.
Transactions services are more costly when w and R increase, but are less expensive when m
and l are more productive.  ￿ < 1 means that there are few possibilities for substitution of T for
x, so a change in R/A - say because of an increase in A - does little to the demand for T.  The
productivity effect of A therefore dictates that the demand for m and l fall.  For ￿ > 1, the
substitution towards transactions services outweighs the productivity effect so the demands for
m and l increase.
It is shown by Fujiki and Mulligan (1996) that, as money's share of cost (Rm/c)
approaches  zero (say, as ￿￿0), the derived demand for money shares several properties with f
the expansion path (4)' shown above.  In particular, the scale and own-price elasticities of the
two functions are identical, as are the wage elasticities.  The x-augmenting technological shift
parameter does not appear in the derived money demand equation as ￿￿0: f





log mit ￿ log L yit, Rt, wit, Ait, ￿it ￿ ￿ log yit ￿ ￿ log Rt ￿ ￿1(1 ￿ ￿)l o g
w it
Rt
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      ￿  is the share of labor and 1-￿  the share of money in the cost of producing of transactions
7
1            1
services.  For the 1993 U.S. economy, R*M1 is about 1% of GNP.  ￿  = 0.75 implies that 3% of 1
GNP is paid to workers who produce transactions services.  3% may or may not be accurate for
the U.S. economy, but its plausibility shows that the parameters used in the illustrative
example above are believable.
(3)''
small, the elasticity of money demand with respect to A is ￿-1.  (3)' is the primary empirical
specification, with the most attention devoted to estimates of ￿.  For ￿ < 1, I say that there are
scale economies in the demand for money by firms.  ￿ < 1 means that firms with lots of sales hold
proportionally less money than do firms with fewer sales.
II.D Scale Economies and Secular Trends in Velocity
A more detailed discussion of aggregate data appears in Section VI, but I point out in
the present section that the production functions (1) and (2) are consistent with both scale
economies in the demand for money (￿ < 1) and secular declines in the velocity of circulation.
To see this consider the special case of 5 =1.  In this case, the production of transactions 1
services is Cobb-Douglas:
Assume ￿ < 1.  Because of the scale economies, transactions services grow more slowly than do
sales or x.  Money can grow more rapidly than transactions, however, if wages are growing.
Consider the derived demand for money (3)'' for the Cobb-Douglas case:
If sales and wages are growing at the rate g while R, q, and A are not growing, then the growth
rate of real balances is [￿ + ￿ (1-￿)]g.  For the parameter values ￿=0.75, ￿ =0.75, and ￿=0.33, 1              1
there are economies of scale while real money balances grow 25% faster than sales and wages.
7
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      Consider another model of firm behavior.  As before, firms face production functions like
8
equations (1) and (2), but x is exogenously fixed (in a way that is uncorrelated with the level of
financial technology).  Profit maximizing firms demand money according to (3)'.  Like the cost-
minimizing model in the text, sales is uncorrelated with the money demand error term.
I think of data from firms as approximating the limiting case ￿ ￿ 0 and justify this f
assertion on the grounds that the cost of producing transactions services is fairly small -
roughly 1-5% of GNP and an even smaller percentage of aggregate sales.  As ￿ ￿ 0, the demand f
for money conditional on (y,w,R,t) is independent of ￿.
The determinants of differences in firm size, such as physical differences in the
production process (modeled here as the parameter ￿), are assumed to be independent of intra-
industry differences in the level of financial sophistication.  Under this assumption, consistent
estimates of ￿ can be obtained by regressing log money on log sales and log wage in an intra-
industry cross-section of firms.  log A is an omitted variable in this regression but, according
to the model, is uncorrelated (in a cross-section) with the volume of sales.  Notice that the
reverse regression does not deliver consistent estimates of 1/￿ because the demand for money
is correlated with A, the level of financial technology.
8
A restriction that has been implicitly imposed by equations such as (3)' is that, at a point
in time, all firms have the same opportunity cost of holding money.   In fact, a less stringent
assumption is required for the following empirical analysis - that variations in the opportunity
cost are uncorrelated with sales and wages within a two-digit industry at a point in time.
Variations over time and across industries in the opportunity cost are captured in the empirical
analysis by including time effects or time varying industry effects.
Some previous studies of the demand for money by firms, such as Maddala and Vogel
(1965) and Vogel and Maddala (1967), have worried that estimates of the sales elasticity are
biased in a quantitatively important way by the omission of firm-specific measures of the
opportunity cost of holding money. However, there are two reasons why cross-firm differences
in the opportunity cost of holding money can be safely ignored in the present study.  First, as
is shown in section IV, variations in sales across firms - even within a two digit industry - are
large enough that an implausibly large covariance between sales and the opportunity cost is
required to generate an economically significant bias of estimates of the sales elasticity.  To see
this, consider a worst-case example.  Suppose that log y and log R are perfectly correlated and
that the interest elasticity is 0.5 (0.5 is fairly elastic when compared to time series estimatesScale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 9
      Firms in this study have filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.  One might
9
therefore expect these firms to enjoy relative easy access to national financial markets.  Access
to financial markets should limit the scope for differences in rates of return across firms.
such as Lucas (1988)).  Suppose further that the coefficient of variation of the opportunity cost
is 0.5.  Such a coefficient of variation would arise, for example, if the standard deviation of R
were 2.5 annual percentage points and the mean were 5 percentage points per annum.   Since
9
the coefficient of variation of sales of firms, even within a two-digit industry at a point in time,
is at least 2, estimated sales elasticities are biased by the amount 0.125 in this extreme case
example.  A more realistic upper bound on the bias is 0.05, which takes into account the fact
that log y and log R fail to be perfectly correlated.
A second reason one can ignore cross-firm differences in R is that omission of firm-
specific measures of ln R probably bias estimates of the sales elasticity upward, making it more
difficult for the present study to find evidence of economies of scale.  The omitted variable bias
is upward in the commonly supposed case that large firms, because they may enjoy better
access to capital markets, face lower rates of return at the margin.
It has also been assumed that higher wages are not associated with greater productivity
in the provision of transactions services.  The acceptability of this assumption depends on the
source of wage and productivity variations in the data.  If wages are high because of a general
increase in capital per worker and the production of transactions services are labor intensive
relative to other sectors of the economy then we can expect higher wages to increase the
demand for money as in equation (3)''.Scale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 10




The firm-level data in this study were obtained from the COMPUSTAT Industrial
Annual Expanded (CST-IAX) files.  Subsection A provides an overview of the CST-IAX firms.
The two definitions of money available in the data set are described in subsection B.  A final
subsection presents the criteria for inclusion of a firm in the money demand estimation.
III.A COMPUSTAT Overview
15,263 companies are included in the COMPUSTAT data set.  Among these are all
NYSE and AMEX listed companies.  Also included are 10,000 or more U.S. firms who file, or
have filed, 10-K forms with the SEC.
10
The companies report detailed income and balance sheet information on an annual basis
for some or all of the years 1950-93.  In addition to the monetary information, I am interested
in each firm's net income, sales, assets, and number of employees.  The data set also includes
an industry code (SIC) for each firm and a code (FIPS) for the county of its headquarters.
Sales is defined as "gross sales net of discounts, returns and allowances" (COMPUSTAT,
pp. 133-35).
III.B Definitions of Money
Firms report two items in the asset column that one might associate with money.  The
first is "cash", defined as "any immediately negotiable medium of exchange.  It includes money
and any instrument normally accepted by banks for deposit and immediate credit to a
customer's account."  (COMPUSTAT, Section 9, p. 33)  Cash includes bank drafts, banker's
acceptances, currency, CD's included in cash by the company, checks, demand certificates of
deposit, demand deposits, letters of credit, and money orders.  CD's included as short term
investments on the firm's balance sheet, CD's reported as a separate item in current assets,
commercial paper, government securities, legally restricted cash, marketable securities,
short-term investments, time CD's, and time deposits are not included in the "cash" category.Scale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 11
      M1 includes currency, traveler's checks, demand deposits, NOW accounts and super-NOW
11
accounts at commercial banks, share draft accounts at credit unions, automatic transfer savings
accounts and other checkable deposits (Goldfeld and Chandler, pp. 506-7).  A few items such
as bank drafts, banker's acceptances, and letters of credit are not included in M1 but are
included in the COMPUSTAT definition of "cash."
      No firm satisfies the criteria for any of the years 1950-55.
12
I treat "cash" as a good proxy for M1.   The "cash" item is not reported by utilities, life
11
insurance, or property and casualty companies.
A second item is "cash and short-term investments," defined as "cash and all securities
readily transferable to cash as listed in the current assets section."  "Cash and short-term
investments" adds to "cash" accrued interest combined with short term investments, brokerage
firms' good faith and clearing house deposits, cash in escrow, cash restricted by federal or other
regulations, CD's included as short term investments, CD's reported as a separate item in
current assets, commercial paper, gas transfer companies' special deposits, government and
other marketable securities, margin deposits on commodity futures, marketable securities,
money market funds, repurchase agreements shown as current assets, real estate investment
trust shares of beneficial interest, restricted cash, time CD's, time deposits, and treasury bills
listed as short term assets.  I think of "cash and short-term investments" as a good proxy for L
(liquid assets) as defined by the Federal Reserve.
III.C Selection Criteria
Firm i is included in my data set for year t if two conditions are satisfied.  First, "cash"
and "sales" must both be reported for that year and not equal to zero.  Second, the county of the
firm's headquarters must be reported.  Most firms are included for only a subset of the years
1956-93.   The right scale of Figure 2 lists the number of included firms by year.  The figure
12
shows that, of the total of 12,000 firms that appear in the sample in at least one year, slightly
less than half appear in any given year.  There are a total of 108,738 firm-years in the main
sample.  Slightly smaller samples are required to obtain data on sales for two consecutive years.
Larger samples are available for a more inclusive measure of money.  Section IV.D compares
some characteristics of non-cash-reporting firms with those of cash-reporting firms and includes
estimates of the sample selection bias.
III.D County Variableslog mit ￿ ￿ log yit ￿ ￿ log Rt ￿ %1(51 ￿ ￿)l o g
w it
Rt
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)l o gA it ￿ (constant)
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(3)'
In addition to monetary and scale variables, the money demand equation includes three
other variables: the nominal interest rate, the price of labor, and the level of financial
technology.  Time and industry effects are used as proxies for these four variables.  In addition,
I merge some information on the county where each firm is headquartered.  The first variable
is the ratio of farm income to total personal income in that county.  The second is wage and
salary income per employee in the county.  Third is the dollar value of unemployment insurance
benefits paid to residents of the county.  The number of workers who work in each county is the
final variable.  County data are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1992) for the years 1969-90.  The 1969 values of the agricultural,
wage and unemployment variables are used for 1956-68 while the 1990 values are used for
1991-93.  As Figure 2 shows, it is not crucial that the county variables are lacking for 1956-68
and 1991-93; most firms appear in the sample between 1969 and 1990.
IV. Estimates of the Demand for Currency and Demand Deposits
IV.A OLS Estimates
The empirical work focuses on the estimation of the derived demand for money (3)',
redisplayed below:
I begin with OLS estimates of (3)', using "cash" as the measure of "money."  The first column
of Table 1 below displays OLS estimates of a regression of log cash on log sales and a set of year
dummies.  This specification omits any proxies for the level of financial technology, wages, or
other prices, but can be taken as a rough estimate of the scale elasticity ￿.  The estimate of ￿,
0.752, is significantly less than unity.Scale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 13
      Year effects are estimated in every regression, so I do not need to worry about correlations
13
over time.
Table 1: Sales and Wage Elasticities of Money Demand (OLS)
independent dependent variable: log cash
variables
log sales 0.752 0.744 0.751 0.744 0.739  0.830 0.763  0.373
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log wage 0.963 0.877 0.742 0.594
(0.030) (0.033) (0.030) (0.030)
agricultural -8.58 -2.98 -0.49 -0.50
area (0.47) (0.51) (0.46) (0.44)
agricultural 19.75 5.60 -0.66 0.27
area (1.72) (1.80) (1.67) (1.58)
2
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year-industry no no no no yes yes yes yes
effects?
firm effects? no no no no no no yes differ-
enced
R ￿ 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.69 0.70 0.83 0.03
2
std error 1.58 1.57 1.58 1.57 1.38 1.29 0.97 1.05
N 108738 108738 108738 108738 108738 102088 102088 87974
Notes:  (1) "cash" is mostly currency and demand deposits.  See text for a detailed definition
(2) "agricultural area" is agriculture's share of personal income in the county where the firm is headquartered
(3) "wage" is wages and salaries per employee in the county where the firm is headquartered
(4) year effects are estimated in every regression
(5) N is the number of firm-year cells included in the regression.  N=102088 is the sample used by Mulligan
(1997), which excludes any firm-year with sales less than one million 1987 dollars and includes only the years
1961-92.  N=87974 is the subsample used by Mulligan (1997) for which lagged cash and sales are observed
(6) standard errors are displayed in parentheses
Column 2 adds a proxy for the cost of labor: wages and salaries per worker in the county where
the firm is headquartered.  With the restriction that transactions services complement other
inputs (￿ < 1) and that labor is a substitute for money (5  > 1), the model predicts that wages 1
should increase the demand for money.  Column 2 is consistent with this prediction, displaying
an estimated wage elasticity of 0.963.
In order for the estimates displayed in column 2 to be consistent, I must assume that
price levels, nominal interest rates, and the degree of financial sophistication are uncorrelated
across firms with sales and the wage.   One might suppose that price levels and/or the level of
13
financial sophistication are associated with the degree of urbanization of the area where theScale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 14
      According to the coefficients on the two agricultural terms, the effect of agriculture on
14
money demand becomes positive for very agricultural areas, but the turning point is at an
agricultural/personal income ratio of about 0.2 or more.  0.2 is, for a intents and purposes,
beyond the range of the data.
      An industry is defined according to the first two digits of the SIC code.  There are a total
15
of 1801 year-industry effects.
firm operates.  To the extent that urbanization increases a firm's ability to produce transactions
services from a given amount of money and a given quantity of labor, I view the agricultural
variable as a proxy for the level of financial technology and expect it to be positively correlated
with the demand for money.  On the other hand, there may be urban/rural differences in
purchasing power parity.  To the extent that there are scale economies (￿ < 1) and price levels
are lower in rural areas, I expect agriculture to be negatively correlated with the demand for
money.
Columns 3 and 4 display results from a regression of log cash on log sales, log wage,
farming's share of income and its square.  Firms headquartered in more agricultural counties
demand less money.   The estimated sales elasticity is not much different from the previous
14
specifications; column 4's estimate is 0.744.  Inclusion of the farming variable affects the
estimate of the wage elasticity - it fell from 0.963 to 0.877.
It is reasonable to expect that production functions vary across industries, although it
is not clear how cross-industry differences in the degree of financial sophistication might be
correlated with sales.  To check for the possibility that the finding of scale economies in columns
1-4 may be due to cross-industry differences in the degree of financial sophistication, columns
5-8 estimate separate year effects for every industry (equivalently, separate industry effects for
every year).   Inclusion of the year-industry effects does not change the estimated sales
15
elasticity; column 5 displays an estimated sales elasticity of 0.739, which is significantly
different from one.  Firms headquartered in rural counties or in counties with low wages
demand less money.  The estimated wage elasticity when the agricultural variable is included
is 0.742.
Both cash and sales are rounded to the nearest $1000 by COMPUSTAT.  This rounding
could bias estimated sales elasticities for small firms.  Column 6 therefore repeats the
specification of Column 5, but omits any firm-year with sales less than one million 1987 dollars
and includes only the years 1961-92 (this is the sample used by Mulligan 1997).  The estimated
sales elasticity does increase somewhat when the sample is restricted in this way, because ofScale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 15
the apparently different behavior of the smallest firms.  See subsection IV.F for some evidence
on how the sales elasticity might vary with the level of sales.
Column 7 displays the firm fixed effects (together with year-industry effects) estimator
of 0.763 reported by Mulligan (1997).  It is found by first deviating each firm-year's log cash and
log sales from the means of those variables for the corresponding cross-section.  Firm effects are
then estimated in the usual way in the resulting panel data set of deviated log cash and log
sales.  Since most firms are not in the sample every year, it is sufficient to assume that the
mean firm effect is the same for each sampled cross-section in order to show that the fixed effect
estimator consistently estimates ￿ in the model with firm and year-industry fixed effects.
Column 8 estimates ￿ = 0.373 by differencing equation (3)' and then estimating year-industry
effects on the resulting panel (using the smaller sample required to observe lagged cash and
sales).
The firm fixed effect estimate of 0.763 is somewhat lower than the corresponding
estimate with only year-industry effects (column 6) while the differenced estimator of 0.373 is
a lot lower, a result which is expected if sales are measured with some error.  Measurement
error is discussed in more detail in the next subsection, but the results reported in Columns 6
and 7 might be used as proposed by Griliches and Hausman (1986) to compute a fixed effects
estimator that is consistent in the presence of classical  measurement error.  Their estimator
depends on the number of periods T an observation is repeated - which varies across firms in
my sample - but in this case the Griliches and Hausman (1986) estimator is quite insensitive
to T and is approximately 0.86.
Figure 2 displays cross-sectional estimates of the sales elasticity from two regression
specifications.  The first specification corresponds to column 5 of Table 1, regressing log cash
on log sales, log wage, agriculture and its square, and two-digit industry dummies in each of
24 cross-sections (1969-92).  The estimated sales elasticities are graphed as a solid line.  Dotted
lines illustrate the corresponding 95% confidence interval.  The second specification,
corresponding to column 4 of Table 1, omits the industry dummies.  Sales elasticities estimated
without industry dummies are displayed as a dashed line (no confidence interval is shown).
The bars indicate the number of firms in each cross-section.  For both specifications, the sales
elasticity is less than 0.9 in every year.  The hypothesis of ￿ = 1 can be rejected in any cross-
section.year
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Figure 2  Cross-Sectional Estimates of the Sales Elasticity
I assume that ￿ is the same for all industries and all years.  Figure 2 suggests that there
is some variation over time in ￿.  ￿ may vary across industries although I have found that the
Financial, Insurance, and Real Estate (FIRE) industries are the only potential outliers:
estimated ￿ for FIRE industries is near one is some specifications and near 0.75 for other
specifications.
Cross-sectional estimates of the wage elasticity from the same two regression
specifications are displayed in figure 3.  As in figure 2, the solid line graphs elasticity estimates
obtained from cross-sectional regressions with industry dummies; dotted lines illustrating the
corresponding 95% confidence interval.  Estimates obtained without industry dummies are
displayed, without a confidence interval, as a dashed line.  Point estimates from both
specifications are positive in every year except 1969.  The wage elasticity appears to be
increasing over the period, although standard errors are too large to convey very precise
information about secular trends.year
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      Note, however, that very few firms are in the sample for the entire sample period.  Each
16
year, many firms leave the sample and others join it.
Figure 3  Cross-Sectional Estimates of the Wage Elasticity
The standard errors computed for the pooled estimates displayed in Table 1 assume that
all 108,738 error terms are independently distributed.  To the extent that any particular firm's
error term is serially correlated, the OLS standard errors displayed in Table 1 are
understated.   If serial correlation were the only reason the pooled OLS standard errors were
16
misleading, then I can use standard errors computed from the cross-section to put an upper
bound on the "true" standard error.  As the tight confidence intervals shown in Figure 2 show,
the sales elasticity is estimated very precisely in each of the 1969-92 cross-sections; standard
errors are close to 0.009 in every cross-section.  Thus, with a standard error of the sales
elasticity estimate somewhere between 0.002 and 0.009, I can be confident about the rejection
of a unitary sales elasticity.
Confidence about the wage elasticity relies somewhat more on the assumption that
multiple cross-sections add independent observations to the analysis.  The cross-sectional
confidence intervals displayed in Figure 3 are wider (a cross-sectional standard error of 0.15Scale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 18
      The assumption of cross-sectional independence is somewhat less defensible when county
17
variables are included in the regression because some sample firms are in the same county in
the same year.  Appendix Figure A-1 shows, however, that not too many sample firms are in
the same county in the same year.  Cross-sectional dependence resulting from the use of county
variables affects confidence about the estimates of the coefficients on those variables but,
because sales is not highly correlated with the county variables, not confidence about the sales
elasticity estimates.
      See section II.E for a discussion.  The sales elasticities implied by the reverse regressions
18
(not reported in the text) are larger than one and the implied wage elasticities are negative.
      If measurement errors are negatively correlated over time (perhaps because sales from
19
year t are misallocated to year t+1 or year t-1), then IV estimates of the sales elasticity are
biased upwards.
is typical), although one can confidently reject the hypothesis that the wage elasticity is zero.
17
IV.B Measurement Error
While the finding of scale economies in the holding of money is not surprising in the
light of some theoretical analyses such as Allais (1947), Baumol (1952), Miller & Orr (1966),
and Tobin (1956), one should address the possibility that errors in the measurement of sales
are the cause of the rejection of a unitary scale elasticity.  If errors in the measurement of sales
were of the classical variety, I would expect estimates of the sales elasticity to be biased
downward.
One way to address this possibility is to suppose that only sales is measured with error
(not money or wages) and run the reverse regression.  However, a reverse regression induces
an upward bias on the estimated sales elasticity.  The bias occurs, according to the theory,
because money balances are correlated with the omitted variable log A , but sales are not. it
18
Moreover, the reverse regression requires an assumption of a substantial degree of error in the
measurement of sales, but not of money.  I expect instead that money is (relatively) poorly
measured for two reasons.  First, cash is a point-in-time report of a stock, as opposed to sales
which is time averaged.  Second, one can argue that the measured value of sales closely
corresponds to its theoretical counterpart, while the measured stock of money may not.
Table 2 tackles the measurement error problem in a different way.  Assume that errors
in the measurement of sales are serially uncorrelated (and uncorrelated with future shocks to
the money demand function).  Then consistent estimates of the sales elasticity can be obtained
with two stage least squares, using lagged log sales as an instrument for current log sales.
19Scale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 19
The first two columns in Table 2 have only log sales and year effects as regressors.  Column 1
presents the OLS estimate in the smaller (99549 firm-years) sample required to have
information on both current and lagged sales.  The IV estimates are presented in column 2; I
see only a small change in the estimated sales elasticity.  IV estimates are only slightly
different when log wage and the agricultural variables are included, as is shown in columns 3
and 4.  Adding year-industry effects to the money demand equation, as is done in columns 5-8,
fails to contradict the conclusion that IV estimates of the sales elasticity are very close to the
OLS ones.  One sees, for example, in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 that the OLS estimate of the
sales elasticity is 0.765 when log wage and agriculture are included as regressors, while the
corresponding IV estimate is 0.768.
Table 2: Sales and Wage Elasticities of Money Demand (OLS & IV)
independent dependent variable: log cash
variables
log sales 0.775 0.778 0.767 0.769 0.765 0.768 0.834 0.830
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log wage 0.840 0.834 0.687 0.679 0.575 0.583
(0.034) (0.035) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031)
agricultural -3.38 -3.39 -0.65 -0.65 -0.65 -0.65
area (0.55) (0.56) (0.49) (0.51) (0.48) (0.49)
agricultural 7.27 7.29 -0.37 -0.35 0.45 0.43
area (1.99) (2.04) (1.85) (1.90) (1.77) (1.83)
2
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year-industry no no no no yes yes yes yes
effects?
R ￿ .61 .59 .61 .59 .70 .68 .71 .69
2
std error 1.54 1.58 1.54 1.57 1.35 1.39 1.27 1.32
N 99549 99549 99549 99549 99549 99549 94424 94424
OLS or IV? OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Notes:  (1) "cash" is mostly currency and demand deposits.  See text for a detailed definition
(2) "agricultural area" is agriculture's share of personal income in the county where the firm is headquartered
(3) "wage" is wages and salaries per employee in the county where the firm is headquartered
(4) year effects are estimated in every regression
(5) N is the number of firm-year cells included in the regression.  N=94424 is the sample used by Mulligan
(1997), which excludes any firm-year with sales less than one million 1987 dollars, includes only the years 1961-
92, and includes only firm years for which lagged sales is observed.
(6) For IV estimates, lagged sales is used as an instrument for log sales.  agriculture, log wage and dummy
variables are also instruments if they are among the second stage regressors.
(7) standard errors are displayed in parentheseslog y
p
it ￿ ￿log y
p
i, t￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)l o gy it
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As one might expect, an IV procedure leads to higher estimates of the sales elasticity than does
OLS, but the magnitude of the difference is (economically) insignificant for all four
specifications.  The only (minor) exception is shown in columns 7 and 8 for the more restricted
sample used by Mulligan (1997).
Another possibility is that, in contrast to the money demand function derived from the
model of section II, a firm's demand for money depends on "permanent sales" rather than
current sales.  If so, then the IV estimates shown in Table 2 are still biased downward.
Consider an analogue to Friedman's (1957) permanent income example.  The log of "permanent
sales" y  is updated as an average of current log sales and past permanent log sales:
p
It follows that log permanent sales is a geometrically weighted average of the logs of all past
sales.  One way to estimate the scale elasticity of money demand, which now depends on
permanent sales, is to include current and all lags of sales in the money demand equations.
The sum of coefficients is an estimate of ￿.  Table 3 includes current and one lag of log sales in
the money demand equation.  When year-industry effects as well as agriculture, its square, and
the log wage are included, the estimated coefficients on current and lagged log sales are 0.701
and 0.065, respectively.  The sum, 0.766, is reported as the "log run scale elasticity", and is
quite similar to the elasticity of 0.765 estimated in column 5 without lagged sales.  One might
add more lags of log sales to the regression (at the cost of reducing the sample size), but it
appears that coefficients on longer lags would be quite small.Scale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 21
Table 3: Permanent Sales Elasticity of Money Demand (OLS)
independent dependent variable: log cash
variables
log sales 0.775 0.715 0.767 0.710 0.765 0.701 0.834 0.919
(0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.011)
log sales, lag 0.061 0.057 0.065 -0.085
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
long run scale 0.775 0.776 0.767 0.767 0.765 0.766 0.834 0.834
elasticity
log wage 0.840 0.837 0.687 0.684 0.575 0.577
(0.034) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
agricultural -3.38 -3.39 -0.65 -0.64 -0.65 -0.66
area (0.55) (0.55) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.48)
agricultural 7.27 7.28 -0.37 -0.39 0.45 0.50
area (1.99) (1.99) (1.85) (1.85) (1.77) (1.77)
2
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year-industry no no no no yes yes yes yes
effects?
R ￿ .61 .61 .61 .61 .70 .70 .71 .71
2
std error 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.35 1.34 1.27 1.27
N 99549 99549 99549 99549 99549 99549 94424 94424
Notes:  (1) "cash" is mostly currency and demand deposits.  See text for a detailed definition
(2) "agricultural area" is agriculture's share of personal income in the county where the firm is headquartered
(3) "wage" is wages and salaries per employee in the county where the firm is headquartered
(4) year effects are estimated in every regression
(5) N is the number of firm-year cells included in the regression.  N=94424 is the sample used by Mulligan
(1997), which excludes any firm-year with sales less than one million 1987 dollars, includes only the years 1961-
92, and includes only firm years for which lagged sales is observed.
(6) "long run scale elasticity" is the sum of the estimated coefficients on all sales terms
(7) standard errors are displayed in parentheses
Results from the more restricted sample used by Mulligan (1997) are shown in columns
7 and 8.  Although it is still true that the estimated long run sales elasticity is unaffected by
the inclusion of lagged sales, it is interesting to note that lagged sales is negatively related to
cash holdings in this restricted sample.  Perhaps this difference is expected because of the extra
measurement error for the smallest firms induced by COMPUSTAT rounding.  In any case, the
negative coefficient on lagged sales is consistent with the predictions of stochastic inventory
models such as Miller and Orr (1966).  In those models, sales has a dollar-for-dollar effect on
cash holdings in the “short run” (and, since sales is larger than cash, a more than proportional
effect) where the “short run” is the time period before the “Ss bounds” are hit and a “trip to theavg log sales = 5.3, std dev = 2.50
Sales, millions of 1987$, log scale
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Figure 4  Sample Distribution of Sales (N = 108,738)
bank” is triggered.  Permanent changes in the amount of sales, on the other hand, change the
frequency of “trips to the bank” and therefore have less than a proportional effect on cash
holdings.  One therefore expects a coefficient on current sales that is larger than the long run
elasticity and perhaps even greater than one, depending on how the “short run” compares to
the time period over which measured sales are aggregated.
There appears to be little evidence for the hypothesis that estimated sales elasticities
are substantially biased as a result of errors in the measurement of sales.  This conclusion is
not a surprise, as sales is a fairly well defined concept and is easily measured.  Cross-sectional
differences in measured sales are quite large, both within and across industries.  Figure 4
displays a histogram of sales (log scale) for the 108,738 firm-years in the main sample.  Some
firms have billions of dollars or more in sales (eg., IBM with $65 billion in sales in 1992) while
others have as few as a hundred thousand dollars.  The standard deviation of log sales is 2.5.
Because several regressions in this paper include year-industry effects, a measure of the
dispersion of sales relevant for interpreting the estimates is the ratio of each firm's sales to the
sample average for the corresponding year and industry.  Figure 5 looks across industries,
displaying a histogram of sales as a ratio to each firm's 2-digit industry average for the yearaverage log = -0.1, std dev = 2.13
Sales, ratio to industry avg, log scale
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Figure 5  Sample Distribution of (Sales/Industry-year Avg)
N = 108,738
(again on a log scale).  One sees that, even within industries in a given year, there are vast
differences in sales across firms.  The standard deviation of the log of the sales to industry
average ratio is 2.13.  Some firms are a hundred times larger than the industry average, while
others are a hundred times smaller.
IV.C Business Cycle Effects
I have interpreted the positive estimated wage elasticity as evidence that time is a
substitute for money in the production of transactions services, an interpretation which is
crucial if one is concerned with the macro implications of these firm-level money demand
functions (see section VI for a discussion).  An alternative view of the wage correlation is that
both wages and the demand for money vary over the business cycle, but that an exogenous
change in the wage would have no effect on the demand for money.  Thus, according to the
business cycle story, a recession in a region or industry decreases the demand for money at the
same time that it decreases wages.
This section presents evidence that a business cycle story cannot explain the positive
correlation of "shocks" to the demand for money with a proxy for the wage rate.  First, I show
that differences in wages across firms (more accurately, differences in the average annualScale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 24
      Some of the persistence wage differences, however, are associated with Census region.
20
Firms headquartered in low wage Census regions actually hold more money.  Thus the wage
elasticities reported in this paper are due to within-Census-region wage differences; the
estimated wage elasticity  increases by about 0.1 when Census region dummies are included
in the log(cash) regressions.
earnings in the county where firms are headquartered) are very persistent.   Second, a proxy
20
for the unemployment rate in the county where the firm is headquartered is introduced into the
money demand equation together with the average earnings of that county.  There is some
evidence that firms demand more money for a given level of sales in good economic times, but
estimates of the wage elasticity do not change when the unemployment variables are
introduced.  Third, estimated wage elasticities are still as large as 0.74 when industry-based,
as opposed to geography-based, proxies for the business cycle are introduced into the money
demand equation.
Different counties are at different stages of the business cycle, but this is not the
primary reason why there are cross-county differences in wages.  For example, the cross-county
correlation of the log of wages and salaries per worker for 1990 and the same variable for 1970
is 0.68; wages regress to the mean at about 2% per year across counties.  The fact that cross-
county differences in wages are persistent call into question the business cycle interpretation
of the estimated wage elasticity.
As a proxy for the business cycle conditions facing each firm, this study uses annual
county-level data on unemployment insurance payments for the years 1969-90.  I argue that
the ratio of unemployment insurance benefits per employee in a county in a particular year,
relative to the county's average for the years 1969-90, is a good proxy for that county's position
in the business cycle.  The ratio is deviated from the county average to allow for location specific
unemployment insurance policies or sectoral composition that might independently influence
the quantity of unemployment insurance payments.  The ratio is correlated with a more
commonly employed business cycle variable, the unemployment rate.  To see this, the time
series of cross-county averages of the u.i.-employment ratio displayed as the solid line in Figure
6.  The figure shows that the ratio moves with the U.S. unemployment rate for all workers
(displayed in the figure as a dashed line) over time.year
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      The civilian unemployment rate for 1990 is computed at the county level by the Missouri
21
State Census Data Center using the 1990 Census of Population and can be obtained over the
internet at bigcat.missouri.edu.
Figure 6  Unemployment insurance benefits per worker
as a business cycle variable
Per worker unemployment insurance benefits are also a reasonable cross-sectional business
cycle measure.  In a cross-section of 3083 counties for the year 1990, the unemployment rate
and u.i. benefits per worker have a correlation of 0.49.
21
Table 4 introduces the u.i. per worker variable (deviated from the county average) into
the money demand equation.  One sees that estimates of the sales and wage elasticities of
money demand are insensitive to the inclusion of this business cycle variable.Scale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 26
      The same criticism applies to the unemployment rate.
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Table 4: Business Cycle Effects (OLS)
independent dependent variable: log cash
variables
log sales 0.744 0.744 0.744 0.745 0.739 0.739 0.739 0.739
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log wage 0.963 0.958 0.877 0.872 0.759 0.759 0.742 0.743
(0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030)
agricultural -2.98 -3.01 -0.49 -0.50
area (0.51) (0.51) (0.46) (0.46)
agricultural 5.60 5.61 -0.66 -0.64
area (1.80) (1.80) (1.67) (1.67)
2
temporary u.i. 5.47 4.13 -7.09 -7.45
(7.76) (7.76) (7.08) (7.08)
temporary u.i. -7700 -7691 -98 -107
2
(1638) (1638) (1474) (1474)
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year-industry no no no no yes yes yes yes
effects?
R ￿ .60 .60 .60 .60 .69 .69 .69 .69
2
std error 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38
N 108738 108738 108738 108738 108738 108738 108738 108738
Notes:  (1) "cash" is mostly currency and demand deposits.  See text for a detailed definition
(2) "agricultural area" is agriculture's share of personal income in the county where the firm is headquartered
(3) "wage" is wages and salaries per employee in the county where the firm is headquartered
(4) "temporary u.i" is unemployment insurance benefits per worker in the county where the firm is
headquartered minus that county's average u.i. for the years 1969-90
(5) year effects are estimated in every regression
(6) N is the number of firm-year cells included in the regression
(7) standard errors are displayed in parentheses
An alternative business cycle variable is unemployment benefits per worker, as opposed
to unemployment benefits per worker deviated from the 1960-90 county average.  It is less
appealing to call the former variable a business cycle variable as there are very persistent
differences in this ratio across counties.   However, the ratio fits better in the money demand
22
equation than does the ratio deviated from the 1969-90 mean.  Results with the ratio alone are
not reported in a table for two reasons.  First, introducing the ratio does not affect estimates
of the sales and wage elasticities.  Second, I see no theoretical justification for preferring a
permanent u.i variable over a temporary u.i. variable.Scale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 27
      The COMPUSTAT firms in my sample account for 30-50% of the sales reported by
23
corporations to the IRS (see Appendix Table A-1 and IRS, various issues).  For example, $2.6
trillion in sales appear in my sample for 1987 compared to the $8.4 trillion in "business
receipts" reported by U.S. corporations to the IRS (IRS, 1987 Table 2).
I have estimated the wage elasticity using differences in the location of firms.  Moreover,
Tables 1 and 4 show that the estimates are sensitive to inclusion of time-varying industry
effects.  I have interpreted the industry effects as proxies for industry specific differences in the
production function, but one might also argue that, at a point in time, different industries are
at different stages of the business cycle and that a business cycle variable needs to be included
in the money demand equation.  To the extent business cycle effects are common within an
industry, estimates of the wage elasticity do not reflect business cycle effects whenever time
varying industry effects are estimated, such as in columns 5 - 8 of Table 1.
IV.D Selection Bias
The set of firms which appear in my samples for estimation of the sales elasticity are a
subset of all U.S. firms.   This section suggests how my estimates of the demand for money
23
might be indicative of the demand for money by a typical U.S. firms.  On one potential source
of selection bias - the decision by COMPUSTAT firms to report money as a separate balance
sheet item - I have some significant evidence.  There is also information on a second source -
the selection of firms into the COMPUSTAT data set.
A substantial fraction of the COMPUSTAT firms that report their sales do not report
their cash holdings.  For example, there are 152,550 firm-years that, if they had reported their
cash holdings, would be eligible for inclusion in Tables 1 and 4.  However, only 108,738 of those
firm-years (71%) actually do report cash.  To consider the selection bias that arises from
omitting the 36,889 non-cash-reporting firms from the regressions, I first compare the typical
reporting firm-year to the typical nonreporting firm-year.Scale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 28
      Estimates of a probit model are consistent with the inferences that I have drawn from
24
Table 5: log sales has a negative effect on the probability of reporting cash in a probit model
with year dummies, log sales, log wage, agriculture and its square as explanatory variables.
Log wage has a statistically insignificant effect on the reporting probability, with a point
estimate that is roughly one-eighth of the coefficient on log sales.
Table 5: Cash-reporting vs. Non-cash-reporting firms (all years pooled)
Cash-reporting Non-cash-reporting
N 108,738 43,812
average sales 668 858
average log sales 3.95 4.80
average wage 23,283 26,155
average log wage 10.04 10.11
Note  (1) sales is in millions of 1987 $.
(2) "wage" is average annual earnings per worker in the county where the firm is
headquartered and is measured in 1987 $.
(3) the GNP implicit price deflator is used to convert all current $ to 1987 $.
We see in Table 5 that the average nonreporting firm has more sales (and slightly higher
wages) than the average nonreporting firm.  On a year-by-year basis, the average nonreporting
firm is larger than the average reporting firm in 24 of 24 cross-sections (1969-92).
Since the decision to report cash does not appear to be random, more needs to be said
about each firm's probability of inclusion in the sample.  A plausible explanation for a firm's
neglecting to report cash is that cash is "too small."  For example, a firm with little cash may
not choose to separate it from other current assets in its annual report or may not find doing
so worth the cost of counting.  Or the value for cash holdings may be truncated in the process
of coding by COMPUSTAT.  How sample selection biases OLS estimates of the sales elasticity
depends on the magnitude of the relationship between sales and the selection rule.  Since it
appears from Table 5 that the typical nonreporting firm has more sales, the "too small"
hypothesis predicts that the true sales elasticity is smaller than those reported in Tables 1-4.
The rejection of the unitary sales elasticity inferred from the OLS results cannot, according to
the "too small" selection hypothesis, be attributed to this form of sample selection bias.
24
To obtain a rough estimate of the magnitude of the upward sample selection bias, I
estimate the model (5):log mit ￿ ￿t log yit ￿ %1,t(51,t ￿ ￿t)l o gw it ￿ ￿
￿
t Zit ￿ Jit
mit observed if log mit >l o g m it ￿ ’y,t log yit ￿ ’w,t log wit ￿ ’
￿
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      Industry dummies are not included in the model (5) in order to facilitate computation.  The
25
sample used is the Mulligan (1997) sample of 102,088 cash reporting and 35,141 cash
nonreporting firm-years with sales of at least one million 1987 dollars.
      The sales and wage elasticities are identified in the model (5) only because the form of
26
distribution of the error terms is assumed to be known; my primary objectives in estimating the
model are to offer an explicit story of the reporting behavior of firms and to provide a rough
indication of the magnitude of the upward sample selection bias.
(5)
where Z 's are vectors comprised of a constant term, year t's agriculture, and the square of t
agriculture.   The random censorship point log m  and the error terms are unobserved.  ’
25
it              y
greater (less) than zero allows for the possibility that large (small) firms are less likely to report
a given amount of money.  For given wage and Z variables, the sign of the selection bias
depends on whether ’  is greater or less than the sales elasticity of money demand (and this is y
true regardless of the form of the error distribution).  Thus, if this form of selection bias is to
explain the deviation of my OLS estimates from unity, it is necessary that ’  < ￿.  However, ’ y        y
< ￿ is inconsistent with Table 5 which shows that non-reporting firms are larger.
When the model (5) is estimated by maximizing the likelihood function separately for
cross-sections at 5-year intervals 1970-90, the estimated sales and wage elasticities are quite
similar to their OLS counterparts.   The selection corrections for the sales and wage elasticities
26
(defined to be the difference between estimates of the model (5) and the corresponding OLS
estimates displayed in Figures 2 and 3) are displayed for each of the 24 cross-sections in Figure
7.  The selection corrections are all economically insignificant.  Estimates of the selectivity bias
of the sales elasticity are always negative, while corrections of the wage elasticity are either
positive or negative depending on the year.  The negativity of the small sales elasticity selection
corrections is consistent with the idea that the censorship point log m  is slightly more sensitive it
to sales than is the demand for money.year
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Figure 7  Sales & Wage Elasticity Selection Corrections
Another way to assess the importance of selection bias is to study quantile regression
with samples that assign very small cash values to the nonreporting firms,  Table 6 reports
cross-sectional estimates of the sales elasticity for the five quantiles 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 and
for the five cross-sections 1970, 75, 80, 85, and 90.  For comparison, the Table also reports OLS
estimates (analogous to those displayed in Figure 2, but using the Mulligan (1997) sample) and
the fraction of cash-nonreporting firms for each cross-section.Scale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 31
Table 6: Quantile Regression Estimates of the Sales Elasticity
cross- fraction not cash-reporting
section reporting cash cross-section
quantile OLS estimate from
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
1970 0.898 0.888 0.855 0.797 0.155 0.870
1975 0.673 0.846 0.821 0.775 0.724 0.060 0.848
1980 0.755 0.775 0.744 0.701 0.137 0.839
1985 0.688 0.751 0.785 0.370 0.868
1990 0.657 0.834 0.810 0.790 0.776 0.056 0.835
Notes:  (1) firms that do not report cash are assigned log(cash) = -20
(2) Sample is that used by Mulligan (1997), which excludes any firm-year with sales less than one million 1987
dollars.
(3) log(wage) is also included in each quantile regression
Consider, for example, the 1980 cross-section where 13.7% of firms (that satisfy the other
selection criteria) do not report cash.  These 13.7% are arbitrarily assigned small values for
cash, so that the 0.1 quantile regression estimate does not make much sense,  However, the 0.3,
0.5, 0.7, and 0.9 quantiles are not affected by the assignment.  We see, for example, that 1980
median regression estimate of the sales elasticity is 0.775, which is somewhat smaller than the
OLS estimate of 0.839 from the cash-reporting sample.  As argued above, we expect the quantile
regression estimates to suggest that the selection bias is positive - most of the quantile
regression estimates are in fact smaller than the OLS estimate for the corresponding cash-
reporting cross-section.
COMPUSTAT does not include all U.S. firms.  Whether or not my estimates of the sales
elasticity are indicative of the typical U.S. firm depends on the relationship between money
holdings, firm size, and inclusion in the COMPUSTAT data set.  If inclusion is correlated with
sales but, conditional on sales and the other explanatory variables, uncorrelated with money
holdings, then my OLS estimates are free from selection bias.  A comparison of IRS statistics
with some computed from COMPUSTAT provide some evidence on this point.  According to the
IRS, the typical U.S. corporation held about $0.10 of cash per dollar of annual sales, as
compared to $0.05 or $0.10 for the COMPUSTAT firms in my main sample.  Although the data
are rough, they - together with a null hypothesis of a unitary sales elasticity - indicate that
COMPUSTAT firms have smaller (more negative) money demand error terms than average.Pit ￿ ¯ qit pit
log Mit ￿ ￿ log sit ￿ [￿ ￿ %1(51 ￿ ￿)]logRt ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)l o gA it ￿
1
2 ￿ ￿ log pit ￿ (constant)
￿ %1(51 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ [
1
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ %1(51 ￿ ￿)] log wit ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ %1(51 ￿ ￿)l o g q it
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      The average firm in my sample has sales in the hundreds of millions of dollars, compared
27
to the two or three million dollars in business receipts reported to the IRS per corporate income
tax return (IRS, various issues).
      Inventory accumulation is neglected.
28
(3)'''
To the extent that COMPUSTAT firms are larger than average, the exclusion of non-
COMPUSTAT firms from my sample probably leads to an upward bias of the sales elasticity.
27
IV.E Firm-specific deflators
"Real" money balances - as opposed to nominal money balances - enter a firm's
production function.  My interpretation of the specifications above assume that the appropriate
deflator for nominal money balances is common across firms, or at least uncorrelated with sales
and wages within a two-digit industry at a point in time once time the agricultural variables
are held constant.  This subsection considers the quantitative importance of this assumption.
Assume that the production function (1) is still valid, but that y  denotes output.  Let it
s  ￿  p y  denote sales.  p  is the date t average sales price of a unit of firm i's output.   Let M it  it it       it                             it
28
denote firm i's nominal money balances at date t and define real money balances m  to be it
M /P , where P  is the geometric average of input prices (q * ) and output prices (p ): it it    it             it        it
According to the production functions (1) and (2), there are two nonmonetary inputs: x
and labor.  Let q  be the price of the nonlabor components of x.  If we suppose that the input it
price index q *  can be approximated as a weighted geometric mean of q  and w , then (3)' implies it                   it   it
the expression (3)''' for firm i's demand for nominal money balances at date t:
where ￿ is labor's share of the firm's costs (think of labor as both a component of x and anScale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 33
argument of the transactions services production function).
log q  and log p  are omitted variables in the specifications reported in Tables 1-4. it     it
Estimates of ￿ are biased only if - within an industry at a point in time - log q  and log p  are it     it
correlated with log sales.  It is doubtful, however, that output prices and nonlabor input prices
vary much within an industry relative to the massive variation in sales (remember that the
standard deviation of log sales net of year-industry effects is larger than 2).
Strictly speaking, the estimated coefficient on log w can no longer be interpreted as an
unbiased estimate of the mongrel substitution parameter % (5 -￿).  The bias depends on 11
￿ [ ￿ - % ( 5 - ￿ )+1/2].  However, data from the national accounts and the IRS Statistics of Income 11
suggest that, in the case ￿￿% (5 -￿) this bias can be no larger than 0.19.  Consider the ratio of 11
aggregate employee compensation (from the national accounts) to the aggregate sales of
corporations filing returns with the IRS.  Because many employees do not work for corporations
that file with the IRS, this ratio is clearly an overstatement of labor's share of cost (￿).  Since
the ratio is 0.37, 0.38, and 0.38 in the three years 1960, 1970, and 1980, respectively, the bias
￿/2 is almost certainly less than 0.19.  The evidence displayed in Tables 1-4 is therefore
consistent with the hypothesis that labor substitutes for money in the provision of transactions
services.
IV.F Nonlinear Money Demand
The functional forms (1) and (2) imply a derived demand for money that is log-linear in
sales, but it is conceivable that the sales elasticity might vary with the level of sales.  Table 7
reports estimate of equation (3)' using samples of firm-years with fairly similar sales.  The table
suggests that the sales elasticity does not vary with the level of sales, with perhaps the
exception of sales less than $1 million or $10 million.Scale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 34
Table 7: Sales Elasticity as a Function of Sales




0.001 1 0.218 0.288 0.355
1 10 0.629 0.634 0.576
10 100 0.856 0.856 0.820
100 1000 0.831 0.825 0.814
1000 0.904 0.903 0.982
Notes: (1) Sales in millions of current $
(2) log(wage) and year-industry effects are include in each regression
(3) “IV sample” excludes firm years for which lagged sales are not observed
(4) IV estimates use lagged log sales, log(wage) and year-industry effects as
instruments for log sales
IV.G A Comparison with Earlier Studies of Firms
Three earlier studies - Meltzer (1963a), Maddala and Vogel (1965), and Vogel and
Maddala (1967) - used cross-sections of firms to estimate the degree of scale economies in cash
holdings, estimating sales elasticities near one.  There are four important design differences
between these previous studies and mine:
(i) The previous studies used cross-sections of industry/asset class aggregates, as
aggregated by the IRS.  The industries are mainly manufacturing.
(ii) The previous studies were for a different time period (1950's).
(iii) The previous studies did not use any longitudinal information.
(iv) The previous studies did not have the information necessary to estimate a wage
elasticity.
Two questions arise “Why did the previous studies obtain a different estimate of the sales
elasticity?” and “What new has been learned from the present study?.”
One potential design difference that might generate smaller estimated sales elasticities
in my study is the extra measurement error inherent in micro-level data.  However, the
analysis above suggests that such measurement error biases are quite small.  Four remainingScale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 35
possibilities are: (1) the previous studies are subject to aggregation bias, (2) scale economies
were less important in the earlier period, (3) the industries used by the earlier studies are
special, and (4) the sales elasticity varies with the level of sales and large and small firms are
weighted differently in the two studies.  By combining my COMPUSTAT data with IRS
industry aggregate data for a comparable time period, I can assess the importance of each of
the four possibilities.
Table 8: Reconciliation with Previous Cross-Sectional Studies
of Firms
Data Set Sales elas.
COMPUSTAT micro data 0.74
COMPUSTAT micro data 1961-92 excluding 0.83
firm-years with sales less than one million
1987 $
COMPUSTAT micro data 1961-92,  excluding 0.81
firm-years with sales less than one million
1987 $, Meltzer industries only
COMPUSTAT micro data 1961-92, excluding 0.96
firms with sales less than one million 1987 $,
Meltzer industries only, aggregated by
industry & asset class
Cross-industry/asset class IRS data, 1963 0.99
Cross-industry/asset class IRS data, 1957 1.01
Notes:  (1) All micro data estimates include year-industry effects
(2)  COMPUSTAT data are aggregated using industries and asset classes as
defined in the IRS Statistics of Income.  Aggregate estimates are not
substantially affected by the exclusion of small firms.
(3)  “Meltzer industries” are wholesale trade, retail trade, and some
manufacturing (SIC codes 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 50-59).
(4)  1957 Cross-industry estimate from Meltzer (1963a)
The first row of Table 8 displays the estimated sales elasticity from column 5 of Table 1.  The
second row displays the estimate from column 6 of Table 1, which is obtained by excluding 6650
firm-years with sales less than one million 1987 dollars and years outside the interval 1961-92.
Doing so increases the estimated sales elasticity by 0.09 to 0.83.  Since Meltzer (1963a) studies
only a minority of the industries sampled by COMPUSTAT, the third row reports the sales
elasticity estimated with COMPUSTAT microdata from Meltzer's industries only; the estimate
seems insensitive to this sample restriction.  The sample is then aggregated by industry toScale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 36
      Since interest rates increased dramatically from the early 1960's to the 1970's, inventory
29
models predict that the scale elasticity would fall.  See Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1996) for
a derivation of this result.
      The IRS estimates are computed as follows: regression estimates are obtained across asset
30
classes within each industry and then these estimates are averaged across industries.
“simulate” the IRS-type data and the resulting estimate of 0.96 is reported in the fourth row
of the Table.  Since previous results suggest that the measurement error does not affect the
micro data estimates, it appears that the larger elasticity reported in fourth row is due to
aggregation bias.  IRS data by industry and asset class from 1963, the latest year for which the
Statistics of Income can be used to replicate Meltzer's study, is used to produce the estimate of
0.99 reported in the fifth row.  The final row of the Table reports Meltzer's estimate from 1957
IRS data which, when compared with the previous two rows, suggests that the sales elasticity
may have fallen over time.
29,30
The present study of firms has produced some new empirical results.  First, it seems
clear that there are scale economies in the holding of money by firms.  Second, aggregation and
selection appears to bias upwards estimates of the sales elasticity.  Third, the demand for
money by firms depends in an important way on the value of time.  Fourth, it appears that the
dynamics of firm cash holdings is consistent with stochastic optimal inventory models -
although this is a topic which was not carefully studied in the current paper.
A list of variables may have been omitted from my basic money demand equation,
including technology parameters, cross-sectional measures of the price level, business cycle
variables, selection effects, and measurement errors.  It appears from Tables 1 - 4 that the
agricultural area variables and the year-industry effects proxy sufficiently well for the omitted
variables.  Estimates such as those displayed in column 5 of Table 1 therefore lead me to
believe that the sales and wage elasticities of the demand for money by firms are approximately
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V. Estimates of the Demand for Liquid Assets
Although the sum of currency and demand deposits constitutes a more preferable
measure of "money" than does liquid assets, one can learn something about firm's demand for
money by studying their demand for liquid assets.  The COMPUSTAT measure of liquid assets,
"cash and short term investments," adds several marketable securities to the firms currency
and demand deposits.   The additions include holdings of government bonds, time deposits, and
commercial paper.
Table 9 displays OLS estimates of the money demand equation (3)', using the log of
"cash and short-term investments" as the dependent variable.  Only year effects and log sales
are included as regressors in column 1; the sales elasticity for liquid assets (0.768) is close to
the sales elasticity for M1 reported in column 1 of Table 1 (0.752).  The wage elasticities
reported in columns 2-4 are higher - about 1.0.  However, inclusion of year-industry effects
reduces estimates of the wage elasticity of the demand for liquid assets from 1.0 to 0.82.Scale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 38
Table 9: Sales and Wage Elasticities of the Demand for Liquid Assets (OLS)
independent dependent variable: log (cash & short-term investments)
variables
log sales 0.768 0.758 0.758 0.758 0.783 0.773 0.773 0.773
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
log wage 1.128 1.048 1.043 0.845 0.822 0.821
(0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029)
agricultural -3.04 -3.13 -0.95 -1.02
area (0.46) (0.45) (0.42) (0.42)
agricultural 10.30 10.49 4.10 4.27
area (1.49) (1.50) (1.47) (1.48)
2
temporary u.i. -0.33 -0.18
(0.09) (0.09)
temporary u.i. 0.02 0.53
2
(0.26) (0.24)
year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
year-industry no no no no yes yes yes yes
effects?
R ￿ .56 .56 .56 .56 .65 .65 .65 .65
2
std error 1.65 1.64 1.64 1.64 1.48 1.47 1.47 1.47
N 144382 144382 144382 144382 144382 144382 144382 144382
Notes:  (1) "cash and short-term investments" is "cash" plus many other marketable securities.  See text for a
detailed definition
(2) "agricultural area" is agriculture's share of personal income in the county where the firm is headquartered
(3) "wage" is wages and salaries per employee in the county where the firm is headquartered
(4) "temporary u.i" is unemployment insurance benefits per worker in the county where the firm is
headquartered minus that county's average u.i. for the years 1969-90
(5) year effects are estimated in every regression
(6) N is the number of firm-year cells included in the regression
(7) standard errors are displayed in parentheses
It appears from Table 9 that the wage and sales elasticities of the demand for the more broad
measure of money are only slightly larger than those for the more narrow measure.log ¯ mt ￿ ￿ log ¯ yt ￿ ￿ log Rt ￿ %1(51 ￿ ￿)l o g
¯ w t
R t
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)l o g ¯ A t ￿ (covariances) ￿ (constant)
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      Income and wages are like to be correlated in cross-sections of regional aggregates as well.
31
      Or one can introduce another variable into the aggregate equation, the ratio of sales to
32
GNP.  See Fujiki and Mulligan (1996) for a more detailed discussion of this and other
aggregation issues.
Sales per firm may grow more slowly than GNP.  According to the IRS Statistics of
Income, business receipts per corporate income tax return grew by 0.2% per year during the
1960s, 0.6% per year during the 1970s and fell by 3.4% per year during the period 1980-87.
Sales per firm displays a slight downward trend in my COMPUSTAT sample.
        Some cross-section studies of households such as Bomberger (1993) and Lee (1964), have
33
found evidence of scale economies.  To my knowledge, separate wage elasticities are not
(6)
VI. Implications for Aggregate Data
The firm-level data indicate that there are economies of scale in the holding of money
in the sense that the production parameter ￿ is less than one.  An important feature of the firm-
level data is that the price of money substitutes (in particular, time) need not be correlated with
sales.  It is straight-forward, therefore, to estimate separate scale and cross-price elasticities
of money demand with the firm data.  Aggregate time series data, on the other hand, have the
unpleasant feature that wages and income are highly correlated.
31
Might the findings for firms' money demand functions apply to an aggregate money
demand equation?  This question can be answered in three parts.  First, there are reasonable
conditions under which a micro level demand function such as (3)' can be aggregated into a
demand function for the entire firm sector.  For example, suppose that y , w , and A  are log- it   it    it
normally distributed in every cross-section of firms.  Then (3)' implies that the demand for
money by the entire firm sector in year t is (6):
where overbars indicate cross-firm averages.  Second, one must argue that sales per firm is
roughly proportional to GNP (if GNP is to be the scale variable in the aggregate equation).
32
Third, households must have demand functions that are similar to those for firms (ie, their
demand functions must have similar scale and wage elasticities) or households must hold a
relatively small fraction of the aggregate money stock.
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estimated, nor are there any attempts to correct for the regression effect.
      The second quarter of 1981 is missing from the DDOS series.  The missing data is shown
34
as a hole in the solid line in Figure 10.
      There are several reasons to prefer the DDOS ratio of firm to household demand deposits
35
as an estimate of the ratio of firm to household M1.  First, FOF estimates are for a single day
(the last day of the quarter) whereas the DDOS intends to measure daily average balances for
the last month of the quarter.  Second, FOF appears to allocate all outstanding currency to the
household sector - an amount equal to $1250 per person in 1994 (U.S. Council of Economic
Advisors, 1994, Table B-69).  For a discussion of these and other problems with FOF estimates
of M1, see Board of Governors (1971).
There is some evidence that firms hold a substantial fraction of M1.  The Federal
Reserve's Demand Deposit Ownership Survey (DDOS) separately tabulates the ownership of
demand deposits at commercial banks by financial firms, nonfinancial firms, households,
foreigners, and "others."  One sees in Figure 8 that, according to the DDOS, nonfinancial firms
hold at least 50% more demand deposits than do households.   By the 1980's, firms had
34
accumulated almost twice as many demand deposits as households had.  However, another
source gives a different picture.  The Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds (FOF) reports the
ownership of currency plus demand deposits by seven major sectors: (1) households, (2)
nonfinancial business, (3) state and local governments, (4) U.S. government, (5) foreigners, (6)
monetary authorities, monetary pools, and federally sponsored credit agencies, and (7) financial
business.  According to the FOF, firms hold less than half of currency and demand deposits as
do households.  A time series of the nonfinancial business/household ratio is displayed in Figure
8 as a dashed line.  The fraction of M1 held by firms has not changed much in the 1980's
according to the flow of funds.  As the aggregate of DDOS numbers correspond much more
closely to aggregate M1 than to the FOF numbers, it is likely that the DDOS are more accurate
and one can conclude than firms do hold a substantial fraction of M1.
35year
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      Remember from figure 2 that not many firms are in the sample before 1969.
36
Figure 8  Nonfinancial business money holdings as a fraction of
household holdings
I also compare changes over time in sales velocity of the sample COMPUSTAT firms
with changes in the velocity of M1.  Figure 9 shows that the sales velocity of the sample firms
(solid line) increased at about the same rate as GNP velocity (dashed line) during the 1970's.
36
The 1980's were different: GNP velocity was fairly stable as compared to the sales velocity of
the sample firms.year
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Figure 11  M1 GNP Velocity vs. Micro Sales Velocity
This paper has estimated a scale elasticity of about 0.75 and a wage elasticity of about
0.70 for firms, estimates which should be indicative of the scale and wage elasticities of an
aggregate money demand function.  The estimates are consistent with the notion that there are
economies of scale in the holding of money, but do not imply that velocity will increase over
time (as income grows).  Consider, as an approximation, that sales per firm, aggregate sales,
income, and wages grow at the same rate over time.  The estimates imply that, for a given level
of financial sophistication, the income elasticity estimated from a time series (say by regressing
log money on log income) might be 1.4 or 1.5.   An income elasticity of 1.5 or 1.6 might be found
if sales per firm grew at half the rate of GNP.  Friedman (1959), using time series data for the
period 1870-1954, finds an income elasticity of 1.8.  Friedman and Schwartz (1982) later revised
this estimate to 1.2 (effectively by ignoring the period 1870-1903, see their p. 243).  The late
nineteenth and early twentieth century time series data appears to be roughly consistent with
my findings.  Lucas (1988) and Meltzer (1963b), however, argue that one obtains an income
elasticity close to one for time series data for the twentieth century.
The Lucas/Meltzer findings can be reconciled with those of Friedman/Schwartz if thereScale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 43
      Three other interest rates - the six month commercial paper rate, the three month Treasury
37
Bill rate, and the six month Treasury Bill rate - result in regression coefficients of -0.67, -0.68,
and -0.74 respectively (standard errors are 0.17, somewhat smaller than the 0.27 obtained
using the AAA bond yield).  These imply near zero estimates of ￿.  Since the AAA bond yield fit
the best and has been used in other time series studies, I use it for the results reported in the
text.
is an omitted financial technology variable such as the A  of my model.  During the early it
twentieth century, there may have been little secular trend of A .  Later in the twentieth it
century, better substitutes for money were developed or made cheaper to use.  NOW accounts,
automatic teller machines, and credit cards might be considered to be modern examples.  This
conjecture is consistent with regional comparisons of money and aggregate income, where
differences in financial technology are less serious.  Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1992) compare
aggregates of income and demand deposits across states for the years 1929-90 and find income
elasticities between 1.1 and 1.5.  Their findings are both consistent with the cross-firm evidence
presented here and with the idea that secular trends in financial sophistication bias time series
estimates, especially those in the twentieth century.
I conclude with an estimate of the interest elasticity.  Although the time dimension of
my data set is not very large (I have 24 large annual cross-sections and five smaller ones),
changes in the nominal interest rate over the period are large enough to permit fairly precise
estimation of an interest elasticity.  The first estimation step is to regress log cash on log sales,
log wage, the agriculture variables, and year-industry effects as is done in column 5 of Table
1.  For each year, I compute the median residual from this regression (where the “residual”
includes the industry-year effects).  Under the hypothesis that the level of financial
sophistication is not correlated with the nominal interest rate, a consistent estimate of -[￿ +
% (5 -￿)] can be obtained by regressing the annual time series of median residuals on the log 11
of the nominal interest rate.  Using annual averages of Moody's AAA corporate bond yield, the
coefficient in this regression is -1.20 (s.e. = 0.27).   An estimate of gamma is obtained by adding
37
the cross-sectional estimate of the wage elasticity, % (5 -￿), to the time series regression 11
coefficient.  0.74 is the estimate of the wage elasticity reported in column 5 of Table 1, implying
an estimate of 0.46 for ￿.Scale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 44
VI. Appendix: Sample Characteristics
This appendix displays in Table A-1 means and standard deviations of the variables
used in the analysis.
Table A-1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
cash level 43 337 0.0008 18262
log 0.49 2.49 -7.10 9.81
liquid assets level 101 865 0.0008 53046
log 1.14 2.61 -7.10 10.88
sales level 668 3385 0.0008 143802
log 3.95 2.50 -7.07 11.88
county avg. annual level 23283 3838 9608 41879
earnings
log 10.04 0.16 9.17 10.64
county farming share of personal 0.005 0.017 -0.112 -0.724
income
county u.i. per worker 156.81 135.49 0 2414
county u.i. per worker minus 69- -3.72 104.52 -608.28 1846
90 county mean
Notes  (1) cash, liquid assets, and sales are in millions of 1987 $.
(2) county avg. annual earnings and u.i. per worker are in 1987 $.
(3) the GNP implicit price deflator is used to convert all current $ to 1987 $.
(4) sample is the 108,738 firm-years used to compute the regressions in Tables 1 and 4.
(5) Nine firm-years in the 108,738 firm-year sample do not report liquid assets.
(6) Liquid assets is "cash and short-term investments."  See Section II for more precise
definitions of the variables.
Figure A-1 illustrates some relationships between counties and firms in the 108,738 firm-year
sample.  The figure is a histogram with the fraction of firm-years on the vertical axis and the
number of firms in the same county in the same year on the horizontal axis.  For example, the
leftmost bar in the figure shows that nearly 25% of the 108,738 data points used to compute the
regressions in Table 1 share a county with nine or fewer other firms in that year (ie, almost 25%county-year cell size
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Figure A-1  County-Year Cell Sizes
N = 108,738
are in county-year cells of size 10 or less).  Another 50% of the data points share a county with
100 or fewer firms in the same year.
Table A-2 lists the SIC two-digit industries that appear in the sample in at least one year.Scale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 46
Table A-2: Two-Digit SIC Codes
SIC Code Number of Firm-Years Industry Name
number %
1 273 0.25 AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION-CROPS
2 141 0.13 AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION-LIVESTOCK
7 90 0.08 AGRICULTURAL & VETERINARY SERVICES
8 21 0.02 FORESTRY
10 611 0.56 METAL MINING
12 234 0.22 COAL MINING
13 4801 4.42 OIL & GAS EXTRACTION
14 259 0.24 MNG, QUARRY NONMTL MINERALS
15 1147 1.05 GENERAL CONTRACTORS & OPERATIVE BUILDERS
16 403 0.37 HEAVY CONSTR-NOT BLDG CONSTR
17 347 0.32 CONSTRUCTION-SPECIAL TRADE
20 3195 2.94 FOOD & KINDRED PRODUCTS
21 184 0.17 TOBACCO PRODUCTS
22 1583 1.46 TEXTILE MILL PRODUCTS
23 1670 1.54 APPAREL & OTHER UNFINISHED TEXTILE PRODUCTS
24 936 0.86 LUMBER & WOOD PRODUCTS, EXCEPT FURNITURE
25 886 0.81 FURNITURE & FIXTURES
26 1359 1.25 PAPER & ALLIED PRODUCTS
27 2198 2.02 PRINTING, PUBLISHING & ALLIED INDUSTRIES
28 4926 4.53 CHEMICALS & ALLIED PRODUCTS
29 886 0.81 PETROLEUM AND COAL PRODUCTS
30 1823 1.68 RUBBER & MISC PLASTICS PRODUCTS
31 508 0.47 LEATHER & LEATHER PRODUCTS
32 1234 1.13 STONE, CLAY, GLASS & CONCRETE PRODUCTS
33 2088 1.92 PRIMARY METAL INDUSTRIES
34 3133 2.88 FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS
35 7901 7.27 MACHINERY & COMPUTING EQUIPMENT
36 7197 6.62 ELECTRICAL MACHINERY, EQUIPMENT & SUPPLIES
37 2932 2.7 TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT
38 6130 5.64 PROFESSIONAL AND PHOTOGRAPHIC EQ, & WATCHES
39 1339 1.23 MISCELLANEOUS MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES
40 344 0.32 RAILROADS
41 50 0.05 BUS SERVICE & URBAN TRANSIT
42 940 0.86 TRUCKING, WAREHOUSING, & STORAGE
44 319 0.29 WATER TRANSPORTATION
45 932 0.86 AIR TRANSPORTATION
46 68 0.06 PIPE LINES, EXCEPT NATURAL GAS
47 339 0.31 SERVICES INCIDENTAL TO TRANSPORTATION
48 2794 2.57 COMMUNICATIONS
49 1589 1.46 UTILITIES & SANITARY SERVICESScale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 47
50 3564 3.28 WHOLESALE TRADE - DURABLE GOODS
51 1978 1.82 WHOLESALE TRADE - NONDURABLE GOODS
52 466 0.43 BLDG MATL,HARDWR,GARDEN-RETL
53 1514 1.39 DEPARTMENT, VARIETY, & MISC MERCHANDISE STORES
54 1219 1.12 FOOD STORES
55 279 0.26 AUTO DEALERS & SERVICE STATIONS
56 942 0.87 APPAREL AND ACCESSORY STORES
57 642 0.59 HOME FURNITURE & EQUIP STORE
58 1929 1.77 EATING & DRINKING PLACES
59 1796 1.65 MISCELLANEOUS RETAIL
60 3490 3.21 BANKS & SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS
61 2144 1.97 CREDIT AGENCIES
62 963 0.89 SECURITY & COMMODITY BROKERAGE
63 245 0.23 INSURANCE CARRIERS
64 409 0.38 INSURANCE AGENTS, BROKERS, & SERVICE
65 2305 2.12 REAL ESTATE
67 3591 3.3 INVESTMENT COMPANIES
70 778 0.72 HOTELS, MOTELS, AND LODGING PLACES
72 402 0.37 PERSONAL SERVICES
73 5286 4.86 BUSINESS SERVICES
75 323 0.3 AUTO REPAIR,SERVICES,PARKING
76 77 0.07 MISC REPAIR SERVICES
78 885 0.81 MOTION PICTURES & VIDEO TAPE PRODUCTION & DISTRIBUTION
79 1275 1.17 ENTERTAINMENT & RECREATION SERVICES
80 1640 1.51 HEALTH SERVICES
81 8 0 LEGAL SERVICES
82 248 0.23 EDUCATIONAL SERVICES
83 95 0.09 SOCIAL SERVICES
84 12 0.01 MUSEUMS, ART GALLERIES, & ZOOS
86 9 0 MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATIONS
87 1750 1.61 ENGR,ACC,RESH,MGMT,REL SVCS
89 13 0.01 PROFESSIONAL & RELATED SERVICES
99 651 0.6 INDUSTRY NOT REPORTED
TOTAL 108738 100.01Scale Economies and the Value of Time (12/97) - 48
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